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Note
The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA
Benefits Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch
Robert Mason Hogg
In suits to recover employee benefits' under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7), 2 plaintiffs
often seek to introduce evidence that they did not previously
present 3 to the employee benefit plan administrator.4 Plaintiffs
offer such evidence, often expert medical or vocational testimony, 5 to demonstrate that they deserve benefits under the
1.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).

2. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. Claimants must exhaust the benefit plan's claim review procedures established under 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) before bringing suit in federal court.
See infra note 33 and accompanying text. There are many reasons why a claimant would not present evidence to the plan administrator. First, claimants who
lack legal representation may not think about presenting expert testimony. See
VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 612 (6th Cir.
1992) (noting claimant had "sixth grade education"). In addition, claimants
may decide that the costs of developing evidence are too great for routine benefit claims. See infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
claimants may be suspicious that plan administrators will abuse their access to
the evidence by attempting to discredit it. See Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1991). Finally, plan administrators may
not provide adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Vanderlok, 956 F.2d
at 616.
4. This Note uses the term "administrator" to describe the person, committee, or company making benefit decisions, although courts also call them
"fiduciaries" or "trustees." See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
5. E.g., Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 790 (11th Cir. 1994) (expert medical testimony); Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 953 F.2d
1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1992) (vocational expert). In Kirwan, the claimant sought
to introduce medical records, expert medical testimony, and Social Security Administration records to show that he became disabled while covered by his employer's disability benefit plan. 10 F.3d at 790.

1575

1576

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1575

terms of an employee benefit plan. 6 Whether a federal court admits such evidence,
however, depends on the circuit in which the
7
court is located.
After ERISA's enactment, federal courts initially reviewed
benefit denials under an arbitrary and capricious standard, limited by the evidence presented to the plan administrator.8 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,9 the Supreme Court directed courts to review suits for benefits under a de novo standard unless the plan's administrator has discretion to make
benefit decisions. 10 Since Bruch, federal circuits have split over
the appropriate evidentiary scope of de novo review in ERISA
benefit cases. In some circuits, courts only review evidence that
the plan administrator considered,". while in other circuits,
12
courts allow claimants to introduce new evidence at trial.
The conflicting rules reflect divergent policy choices. By allowing additional evidence, courts are better able to protect ben6. See, e.g., Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105-06
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that claimant's experts persuaded court to construe plan
terms in claimant's favor).
7. The inconsistent circuit rules described in Part II of this Note lead to
inconsistent treatment of claimants who sue the same plan administrator.
Compare Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1027
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (upholding trial court's use of evidence not presented
to plan administrator) with Scheider v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 820 F.
Supp. 191, 193 (D.N.J. 1993) (excluding offered evidence because administrator's record was "sufficiently developed").
8. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
9. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
10. Id. at 115. Specifically, the Court held that "a denial of benefits challenged under [29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan." Id. (emphasis deleted). Earlier, however, the Court said that its opinion
was "limited to the appropriate standard of review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions
challenging denials of benefits based on plan interpretations."Id. at 108 (emphasis added). As a result, federal courts are split over whether Bruch extends
de novo review to cases where plan administrators deny benefits based on factual determinations about an individual's claim, such as whether a claimant is
disabled, rather than a denial based on plan term interpretations. Compare
Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 453 (1991) (holding that Bruch does not require de novo review of
administrators' factual determinations) with Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1183 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
Bruch requires de novo review of administrators' factual determinations).
11. See Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th
Cir. 1993); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1990).
12. See Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789 & n.31 (11th Cir. 1994);
Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989).
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eficiaries' rights under ERISA plans. 13 Full evidentiary
hearings in ERISA benefits litigation, however, burden federal
courts, undermine the role of plan administrators, and hurt beneficiaries as a group by imposing unexpectedly high litigation
costs on the benefit plan. 14 To accommodate these competing
interests, some circuits have adopted multi-factor discretionary
rules to govern the scope of evidence. 15
Part I of this Note summarizes the federal judiciary's role
within ERISA's regulatory scheme. Part II describes the current federal circuit rules governing the evidentiary scope of de
novo review in ERISA benefits litigation and the reasoning behind the rules. Part III critiques the legal reasoning of the federal circuit courts and demonstrates practical shortcomings of
the current rules. Part IV proposes that rather than admitting
or excluding additional evidence, courts should remand cases to
ERISA plan administrators to make new determinations in light
of the evidence the claimant seeks to offer to the court. This
Note concludes that a liberal remand policy would conserve judicial and benefit plan resources without significantly reducing
the level of protection beneficiaries receive under ERISA plans.

13. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1025
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Protecting beneficiaries is especially important because employee benefit plans provide many beneficiaries with basic human
services such as health care, disability insurance, and death benefits. See, e.g.,
Weber v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 1993) (disability benefits);
Quesinberry,987 F.2d at 1019 (accidental death benefits); Masella v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1991) (health benefits); cf Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) ("[Tiermination of [government welfare] pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits."). Nonetheless, employee
benefits provided by ERISA plans are not as significant in the social safety net
as government programs because even if a plan administrator erroneously denies benefits, the would-be beneficiary may still be able to obtain governmental
assistance. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 964 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting that worker received Social Security benefits after plan administrator
denied disability benefits); Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1455
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
14. See infra notes 154-161 and accompanying text (describing practical
problems with rule allowing claimants to introduce evidence not presented to
plan administrator).
15. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993) (discretionary "good cause" rule); Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025 ("limited discretionary approach").
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I. THE JUDICIAL ROLE WITHIN ERISA'S
REGULATORY STRUCTURE

A. ERISA's

REGULATORY STRUCTURE

Although employee benefits traditionally were a matter of
17
state contract law, 16 ERISA brought employee benefit plans
under federal regulatory authority.' 8 ERISA regulates pension
plans' 9 and aspects of "employee welfare benefit plans," which
include health, disability, and death benefit plans. 20 For pension plans, ERISA establishes standards for financial management 21 and participant vesting.2 2 For both pension plans and
welfare benefit plans, ERISA requires plan administrators to
meet fiduciary standards,

23

disclose information fully,24 and

25
provide fair benefit claim procedures.

16. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
ERISA expressly preempts state law on employee benefit plans, except for state
laws which directly regulate insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A) (1988).
17. ERISA regulates only employee benefit plans, not all employee benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1988). Parties frequently litigate the issue of
whether employee benefits constitute a plan. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co.
v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) (holding that "one-time, lump-sum" severance
payment that "requires no administrative scheme" is not plan).
18. For example, ERISA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
regulations as "necessary or appropriate" to implement ERISA's provisions relating to plan reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 1135
(1988). ERISA also gives regulatory authority to the Internal Revenue Service
and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See JOHN H. LANGBE1N &
BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION & EMPLOYEE BENmn

LAw 70 (1990).

19. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988).
20. Employee welfare benefit plans include health, accident, disability,
death, unemployment, vacation, job training benefits, day care, legal services,
or scholarship funds. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
21. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1988) (minimum funding standards).
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-53 (1988) (minimum participation standards and
vesting requirements). ERISA prohibits employers from discharging employees
to avoid paying benefits. See McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Lasher, 819 F. Supp. 110,
122 (D. Mass. 1993).
23. A plan fiduciary must act "solely in the interest of the participants and
their beneficiaries" and perform her duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(1988). A plan administrator is a fiduciary if she "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in [plan] administration." § 1002(21)(A)(iii).
24. One of ERISA's central policies is information disclosure and reporting.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). Plan administrators must report detailed financial
information to federal regulators and disclose information to individual plan
participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1023, 1025 (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (1988).
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Under ERISA, plan administrators must provide claimants
with a "summary plan description" that describes benefit eligibility and claim procedures. 2 6 When administrators deny benefits, they must give claimants written notice of the reasons for
denial 27 and provide claim review procedures by which claimants may appeal. 2 8 Finally, ERISA guarantees that claimants
may sue for benefits in federal courts, 2 9 but does not give claim30
ants the right to a jury trial.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(j)(1)-(2), (t)(2) (1993). When plan summaries include a disclaimer, the information contained therein may not be binding on
plan administrators. See de Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1195 (4th Cir.
1989).
27. The written notice must provide "specific reasons" for denial and be
"written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1133(1) (1988). Conclusory statements will not suffice as notice. See, e.g.,
Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting administrator's notice which merely said hospital stay to treat alcohol
abuse was "not authorized" beyond twelve days). Even if an administrator has
discretion to determine benefit eligibility, she must provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for denial. Id. at 158-59.
One purpose of the notice requirement is to give claimants an opportunity
to augment the evidentiary record in their favor. VanderKiok v. Provident Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 1992). Some courts, however,
hold that a plan's written explanation is not necessarily the sole basis for judicial review of a benefit denial and that courts may look at other provisions in
the plan to justify the administrator's denial. See, e.g., Weber v. Saint Louis
Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1993); Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979
F.2d 653, 660 (8th Cir. 1992). This practice undermines the function of the
notice requirement.
28. A plan must provide claimants with "a reasonable opportunity... for a
full and fair hearing by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying
the claim." 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (1988). A plan administrator must allow a
claimant or his representative at least sixty days to examine the administrator's record, request an administrative review by written application, and submit written comments in support of the claimants position. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1), (3) (1993). If the plan administrator violates ERISA's procedural requirements, the court should remand the case to the administrator to
provide the requisite review process. Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins.
Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993); Jenkinson v. Chevron Corp., 634 F. Supp.
375, 380 (N.D. Cal. 1986). One court even awarded a claimant $50 per day, or
$15,775, for the administrator's violation of ERISA's claim review requirements. Garred v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1190, 1201 (W.D. Ark.
1991).
29. ERISA provides that, "[a] civil action may be brought - (1) by a participant or beneficiary ... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(1988).
30. See Kirk v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1991) (stating that Seventh Amendment argument in favor ofjury trial right is
"without merit"); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828-30 & n.21 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that neither
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'FEDERAL COMMON LAW" OF JumLiAL REVIEW

The text of ERISA is silent about how federal courts should
review a denial of a plan benefits,3 1 but ERISA's legislative history shows that Congress intended courts "to develop a 'federal
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans.'" 3 2 Using federal common law authority, some courts
33
have required claimants to exhaust claim review procedures.
Some courts also have imposed a duty on plan administrators to
develop all reasonably available evidence that is material to a
34
claim.
After ERISA's enactment, federal courts initially used a deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review in ERISA

ERISA nor the Constitution provides for jury trial right in ERISA benefits litigation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
31. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989);
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1021 (4th Cir.
1993) (en banc). In Bruch the Supreme Court noted that legislation to provide
de novo review failed. 489 U.S. at 114.
32. Id. at 110 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56
(1987)). Senator Javits said that "a body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans." 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22,
1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
33. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990);
Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300-03 (5th Cir. 1985); Kross v.
Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983); Challenger v. Local
Union No. 1 of Intl Bridgeworkers, 619 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1980); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union &
Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816 (E.D.N.C. 1978). Courts expect the
exhaustion requirement to reduce frivolous lawsuits, encourage private non-adversarial dispute resolution, minimize the costs of settling claims, fulfill congressional intent by using claim review procedures, promote uniform
administration of benefit plans, and facilitate judicial review. See Berry v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1985); Grossmiller v.
International Union Local 813, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983); McLean Hosp.
Corp. v. Lasher, 819 F. Supp. 110, 121-22 (D. Mass. 1993). If a claimant fails to
exhaust a plan's claim review procedures, the court should remand the case to
the administrator. Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989).
34. See Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1991); Leahy v.
Bon, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 529, 539-40 (D. Utah 1992); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (D. Minn. 1989); Teeter v. Supplemental
Pension Plan of Consolidated Rail Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1084, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Toland v. McCarthy, 499 F. Supp. 1183, 1190-94 (D. Mass. 1980). But see
Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1992).
If a plan administrator fails to develop reasonably available evidence and the
claimant sues, some courts remand the case to the plan administrator to consider the evidence. Jader,723 F. Supp. at 1342.
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benefits litigation. 35 Because courts saw their role as merely to
review the plan administrator's actions, rather than to enforce
contractual rights,3 6 they limited the scope of their review to the
plan administrator's evidentiary record.3 7 Consequently, when
a plan administrator based a decision on "substantial evidence,"
courts upheld the decision.38 If the administrator's record
lacked an evidentiary basis, courts remanded the case to the administrator to develop more evidence.3 9 Courts awarded bene35. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1049 (7th Cir. 1987) (reciting "black-letter rule" applying "arbitrary and capricious" standard but noting "growing skepticism" about its use).
36. One commentator argues that courts still consider suits to recover benefits "as proceedings for appellate review" rather than as suits to enforce contractual rights. Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1992).
37. See Voliva v. Seafarers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988);
Daniels v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988); Crews v. Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir.
1986); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); Wolfe v.
J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983); Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.10
(8th Cir. 1976); see also Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension
& Retirement Fund Employee Pension Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983)
(stating that courts should not conduct a "de novo hearing" in ERISA cases).
Courts used the rule against additional evidence for three reasons. First,
limiting evidence was the common practice under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1976)
(citing Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962)) (limiting evidence
under LMRA). Subsequent cases relied on Phillips without noting the LMRA
roots of the rule. See Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir.
1985) (citing Phillips);Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied 449 U.S.
1112 (1981). In addition, courts asserted that Congress intended to give plan
fiduciaries "'primary responsibility for claim processing'." Wolfe v. J.C. Penney
Co., 710 F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Challenger v. Local Union No. 1,
619 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1980)). Finally, courts contended that "practical
considerations" also favored limiting evidence to the plan administrator's record. Id. (citing Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare
Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978)). The practical considerations included reducing litigation over frivolous claims, encouraging private non-adversarial methods of dispute resolution, and promoting uniform administration of
benefit plans. Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 420.
In Phillipsv. Kennedy, the plan administrators, not the claimant, sought to
introduce new evidence in an effort to justify its benefit denial. Phillips, 542
F.2d at 55. Thus, a rule that courts now apply against claimants seeking benefits was initially a method for protecting claimants from abuse by benefit plan
administrators.
38. See, e.g., Berry, 761 F.2d at 1007.
39. Id. at 1007; Wardle 627 F.2d at 824; Phillips,542 F.2d at 55 n.10 (citing
Sturgill v. Lewis, 372 F.2d 400, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1966)) (per curiam). One court
even favored remand when the claimant sought to introduce "significant" evi-

1582

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1575

original record showed that the
fits only if the administrator's
40
claimant deserved them.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,4 1 the Supreme
Court rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard in favor of
de novo review except when a plan administrator has discretion 4 2 to make benefit decisions. 43 Bruch also changed the legal
dence "[r]egardless of whether [the plan administrator] based its decision on
substantial evidence," because 'the fiduciary [should] make the initial assessment of whether such facts establish an applicant's eligibility." Wolfe 710 F.2d
at 394. Remand is not required, however, if it would be a "useful formality."
Wardle, 627 F.2d at 828 (quoting Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C.
1958)).
In Sturgill v. Lewis, a pre-ERISA case upon which the remand rule is
based, see Phillips, 542 F.2d at 55 n.10, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals used the remand rule to protect a claimant from the pension trustees'
effort to justify denying benefits on new grounds at trial. Sturgill, 372 F.2d at
401. Remanding the case to the trustees, the court reasoned as follows:
Since the Trustees perform their function as such pursuant to an
the
Act of Congress in an area of social concern and importance ....
proceedings before the Trustees must conform to at least elemental requirements of fairness, [including] notice, a hearing at which the applicant is confronted by the evidence against him, an opportunity to
present evidence in his own behalf, articulated findings and conclusions having a substantial basis in the evidence taken as a whole, and
a reviewable record. If the Trustees for some reason are unable or unwilling to comply with these fairness requirements, in the interest of
proper and prompt disposition of these pension claims, it may become
necessary to reconsider our [rule limiting evidence].
Id. Thus, under labor law, courts used remand on the expectation that pension
trustees would provide fair claim review procedures.
40. E.g., Phillips 542 F.2d at 54.
41. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). The issue in Bruch was whether Firestone's former employees qualified for termination pay after the company that bought
Firestone's plastics division hired them under a provision of the plan providing
benefits for employees "'released because of a reduction in work force.'" Id. at
105-06. The district court granted summary judgment for Firestone applying
the arbitrary and capricious standard, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding
the arbitrary and capricious standard inappropriate when the plan administrator has a conflict of interest, as Firestone did in Bruch because its plan was
unfunded. Id. at 106-08. Affirming the Third Circuit in part, the Supreme
Court rejected conflict of interest as the basis for its decision but said courts
should look at conflicts in judging whether an administrator abused his discretion in cases where plans provide for administrative discretion. Id. at 115.
42. Whether a plan grants the administrator discretion is now frequently
an issue in ERISA benefits litigation. The Eleventh Circuit requires plan instruments to provide discretion in "express language"before granting deferential review. Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 88 (11th Cir.
1989). By contrast, the Third Circuit has held that "[d]iscretionary powers may
be implied by a plan's terms even if not granted expressly." Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Fourth Circuit has also noted that there are "no magic words required to
trigger the application of one or another standard ofjudicial review." de Nobel
v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989).

1994]

ERISA JUDICIAL REVIEW

1583

reasoning behind ERISA's federal common law. Prior to Bruch,
federal courts created ERISA common law primarily by borrowing from labor law,4 but the Supreme Court rejected this
"wholesale importation" of labor law into ERISA. 4 5 Instead,
Bruch relied on principles of trust law,4 6 in which "courts construe terms in trust agreements without deferring to either
party's interpretation." 47 The Court also held that the standard
of review under ERISA must protect beneficiaries at least as
When the plan instrument confers discretion, courts usually review the administrator's decision using an abuse of discretion or an arbitrary and capricious standard limited to the plan administrator's evidentiary record. See
Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992)
(excluding reliable evidence of disability because neither claimant nor his counsel presented evidence to administrator); Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d
1450, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (excluding from review Social Security Administration records that were "never submitted" to plan administrator); Jones v.
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990). The
Fifth Circuit, however, has held that a reviewing court must look at evidence
regarding plan-term interpretation or the administrator's bad faith, whether or
not such evidence appears in the plan administrator's record, to ensure that an
administrator's interpretation of plan terms is reasonable. See Wildbur v.
ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-39 & 642 n.19 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Zigel
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22872, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
1994) (admitting expert medical testimony and evidence of administrator's bad
faith under arbitrary and capricious standard).
43. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. See supra note 10 (describing circuit split over
whether de novo review extends to judicial review of administrator's factual
determinations as well as plan term interpretations).
44. See, e.g., Bruch, 489 U.S. at 109 (noting that courts applied arbitrary
and capricious standard based on labor law); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52,
55 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1962)) (limiting evidence to administrator's record based on labor law); id. (citing Sturgill v. Lewis, 372 F.2d 400, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1966)) (per curiam) (remanding case to plan administrator based on labor law); Taylor v. Bakery &
Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 819-20
(E.D.N.C. 1978) (requiring exhaustion of plan remedies based on labor law).
45. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 109 (emphasis omitted). Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, under which courts use an arbitrary and capricious standard as a basis for jurisdiction, ERISA explicitly authorizes claimants to sue for
individual benefits, making the arbitrary and capricious standard inappropriate under ERISA. Id. at 109-10.
46. The Court found that the "settled principles" of trust law "point to de
novo review of benefit eligibility determinations based on plan interpretations."
Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted). But see Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that
arbitrary and capricious standard is "traditional standard of review of the law
of trusts"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
47. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112. The Supreme Court held that courts should
interpret plan terms as they interpret "contractual provisions," noting that a
"trustee who is in doubt as to the interpretation of the instrument can protect
himself by obtaining instructions from the court." Id.
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much as state contract law protected them prior to ERISA's
48
enactment.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EVIDENTIARY
SCOPE OF REVIEW
In light of Bruch's de novo review requirement, federal circuit courts have reconsidered whether they should limit the
49
scope of review to the plan administrator's evidentiary record.
The circuit have split over whether to admit evidence that a
claimant5 0 did not previously present to the plan administrator.
Courts have followed three separate rules: per se rules limiting
evidentiary review to the plan's administrative record, 5 1 per se
rules allowing claimants to introduce new evidence to the
admitting addicourt, 52 and multi-factor discretionary rules
53
circumstances.
certain
under
evidence
tional
48. Id. at 113-14. The Court also rejected the potential for higher administrative and litigation costs as an argument against de novo review. Id. at 115.
49. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017,
1021 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that Bruch's impact is "not clear"); Perry
v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (reconsidering Sixth Circuit rule in light of Bruch). Because Bruch did not directly resolve the issue,
some courts initially relied on pre-Bruch precedent to limit evidentiary review
to the administrator's record. See McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
888 F.2d 426, 431 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989); Questech, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 956, 962 (E.D. Va. 1989).
50. The Eighth Circuit recently addressed whether a plan administrator
should be able to submit new evidence to the court. Weber v. Saint Louis Univ.,
6 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1993). The district court excluded such evidence because "it
would be unfair to permit [the administrator] to expand the scope of review
beyond the facts available to [her] at the time the decision to deny benefits was
made." Weber v. St. Louis Univ., 804 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (E.D. Mo. 1992). The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding such evidence because the evidence of disability in the plan administrator's record was "insufficient" to sustain a decision in favor of either party.
Weber, 6 F.3d at 561.
Courts first applied the rule limiting evidence to the plan administrator's
record to prevent administrators from changing their rationale for denying benefits after the fact. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir.
1976). Thus, Weber turns the rule's history on its head by allowing administrators to develop post hoc rationalizations for denying benefits. Cf Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962) (holding that "post
hoc rationalizations" are inadequate basis for governmental agency decisionmaking).
51. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.

1994]
A. RULES

ERISA JUDICIAL REVIEW

1585

EXCLUDING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

The Fifth 5 4 and Sixth5 5 Circuit Courts of Appeals prohibit
claimants from introducing evidence at bench trial that was not
presented to the plan administrator. In Perry v. Simplicity Engineering,5 6 the Sixth Circuit ruled that certain hospital records
and expert vocational testimony were inadmissible because the
disability claimant had not presented this evidence to the plan
administrator. 57 The court relied heavily on ERISA's legislative
purpose to support its exclusion of the claimant's evidence. According to the Sixth Circuit, Congress did not want federal
courts to "function as substitute plan administrators."5 8 Instead, the court found that a "primary goal of ERISA was to provide a method for workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes
inexpensively and expeditiously."59 The court contended that
allowing additional evidence would "seriously impair" this
60
goal.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that admitting additional evidence would contravene Congress's intention to give plan administrators the principal role in resolving
factual disputes. 61 The Fifth Circuit contended that because
54. See Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 102 (5th
Cir. 1993); see also Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1558
(5th Cir.) (holding that administrator's factual determinations warrant deferential review), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); Goodman v. S & A Restaurant
Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (rejecting claimant's request to
augment evidentiary record at trial). In Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., the
Fifth Circuit reiterated its rule against admitting additional evidence that relates to factual determinations, but ruled that certain evidence relating to plan
term interpretation or an administrator's bad faith is admissible, because it is
unlikely to appear in the administrator's record for an individual claimant. 974
F.2d 631, 642 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Whisman v. Robbins, 810 F. Supp. 936, 940-41 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (applying
Perry); Apitz v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber Hourly Pension Plan, 800 F. Supp.
1526, 1533 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (same). The Sixth Circuit, however, did direct a
trial court to admit additional evidence when the plan administrator failed to
provide adequate notice and claim review procedures. Vanderflok v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1992).
56. 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).
57. Id. at 965-66
58. Id. at 966.
59. Id. at 967.
60. Id.
61. Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit noted
that "for practical reasons courts simply cannot supplant plan administrators
...as resolvers of mundane and routine fact disputes." Southern Farm Bureau
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, by admitting
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plan administrators conduct the "daily and routine administration of plans," they are positioned better than courts to find facts
in ERISA benefit disputes. 62 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit posited
that plan administrators have "inherent discretion" under trust
law to gather evidence. 6 3 In terms of ERISA's policies, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that admitting additional evidence undermines ERISA's protection of beneficiaries as a group because evidentiary hearings will force plans to pay for higher litigation
costs.

64

B. RULES

ADMITTING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

In direct contrast to the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals follows a per se rule allowing
claimants to submit additional evidence. 6 5 In Kirwan v. Marriott Corp.,6 6 the Eleventh Circuit considered additional evidence
such as medical records, expert medical testimony, and Social
Security Administration records, which showed that the claimant developed her disability while covered by her employer's disability benefit plan. 67

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that

limiting evidence to the plan administrator's record is "contrary
to the concept of de novo review." 68 The Eleventh Circuit also
contended that limiting evidence impermissibly contravenes legadditional evidence, courts violate Congress's intent to "give administrators primary responsibility for processing claims" and to provide for "efficient plan administration." Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1558 n.8 (citing cases).
62. Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1558. The court explained that "the plan administrator enjoys certain advantages that the courts do not have. He is much closer
to the facts and [to] the [claim] investigation." Id. at 1562.
63. Id. at 1558 (emphasis omitted). Since the Fifth Circuit views factfinding as a discretionary act, the court reviews factual determinations under an
"abuse of discretion" standard rather than de novo. Id. at 1562; see also supra
note 10 (describing circuit split over whether courts should review factual determinations de novo).
64. Pierre,932 F.2d at 1559.
65. Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789 & n.31 (11th Cir. 1994);
Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989).
66. 10 F.3d 784 (11th Cir. 1994).
67. Id. at 789-90. The court held that this evidence precluded summary
judgment in defendant's favor. Id. at 790.
68. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89; see also Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, &
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184 (3d Cir. 1991) ("De novo means here,
as it ordinarilydoes, [that]... the court's inquiry is not limited to or constricted
by the .

.

. record ....

") (quoting Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697

(D.C.Cir. 1987)). But see Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that "de novo" may mean either full evidentiary hearing or
merely review based on record below).
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islative intent by giving claimants
less protection than they had
69
prior to ERISA's enactment.
The Second Circuit also follows a per se rule allowing claimants to introduce new evidence when it relates to the interpretation of plan terms. 70 Thus, in Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc.,7 1 the court upheld admission of the claimant's expert medical testimony describing temporomandibular joint dysfunction, a jaw ailment, which supported her interpretations of
the terms "medical" and "dental" in the plan instrument. 72 According to the Second Circuit, hearing evidence relating to plan
term interpretation does not make courts "substitute plan administrators," 73 as the Sixth Circuit suggested, because administrators have no discretion to interpret plan terms. 74 In
Masella, the Second Circuit also found that it is unfair to force
claimants to present evidence about plan term interpretations
to
75
plan administrators against whom they later must litigate.
C.

MULTI-FACTOR DISCRETIONARY RULEs

Three circuits allow claimants to introduce additional evidence under specified circumstances at the discretion of the district court. 76 The Third Circuit generally admits additional
evidence, but grants district judges discretion to exclude evi69. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489

U.S. 101, 113-14 (1989)). In Moon, the insurance company defendant conceded
that absent ERISA, a court would hear additional evidence. Id.; see also Weber
v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 1993) ("But for its statutory basis

in ERISA, [claimants] lawsuit would be considered a common-law contract case
about a disability insurance program.").
70. Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 104 (2d Cir.
1991). The Second Circuit explicitly refrained from deciding whether it would
allow or require courts to admit additional evidence relating to a plan administrator's factual determinations. Id. The Fifth Circuit, which otherwise rejects
additional evidence, also allows courts to hear additional evidence relating to
plan terms. Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1992).
71. 936 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 105-06.
73. Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990).

74. Masella, 936 F.2d at 104.
75. Id. at 105. Specifically, the Second Circuit expressed concern that
presenting expert evidence to administrators who already have "superior access
to the relevant expertise" would be an "unduly heavy burden" for claimants.
Id.; see also Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that evidence relating to plan term interpretation rarely would appear
in administrative record of individual's claim).
76. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993) (implementing discretinary "good cause" rule); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of
North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (employing multifactor "limited discretionary approach"); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, &
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dence if the administrator's record is "sufficiently developed." 77
The Third Circuit reasoned that courts are better suited to hear
evidence because plan administrators have "little knowledge of
the rules of evidence or legal procedures to assist them in
78
factfinding."
The Eighth Circuit follows a discretionary "good cause" rule
for admitting additional evidence. 79 In Davidson v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America,8 0 the court upheld the exclusion of expert vocational testimony and a psychiatric report offered by a
disability claimant.8 1 The court rejected the evidence because
the claimant failed to present the evidence to the administrator
despite "multiple opportunities" to do so during his claim review
process. 82 In a later case, however, the Eighth Circuit required
the admission of additional evidence because the administrator's
record was "insufficient" to make a decision.8 3
The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc in Quesinberry v. Life
Insurance Co. of North America,8 4 developed a multi-factor discretionary rule to govern the evidentiary scope of review. 8 5 In
Quesinberry, the court upheld the introduction of claimant's exPension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1185 (3d Cir. 1991) (granting discretion to
exclude evidence if administrator's record is "sufficiently developed").
77. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1185; see also Scheider v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America, 820 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D.N.J. 1993) (exercising discretion to limit evidence because record was "sufficiently developed").
78. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183 ("Plan administrators are not governmental
agencies who are frequently granted deferential review because of their acknowledged expertise.").
79. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993). In
Donatelli, the Eighth Circuit upheld review of a benefit denial on "a somewhat
expanded factual record," although the court did not explain what the additional evidence was or what cause the district court found for admitting the
evidence. Id.
80. 953 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 1095.
82. Id. In Davidson, the court noted that the administrator provided benefits and the claimant had legal counsel during the claim review process. Id. at
1094. Some circuits have ignored the quality of the claim review process in
judging the proper scope of evidence. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, &
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1991) (making no mention of
whether claimant used claim review procedures); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900
F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). But see Scheider v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America, 820 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (D.N.J. 1993) (relying on Davidson to justify
excluding evidence under Third Circuit's discretionary rule).
83. Weber v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 1993).
84. 987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
85. Id. at 1026-27. The Fourth Circuit said it follows a "limited discretionary standard" under which a trial court should limit itself to the administrator's
record unless additional evidence is "necessary for resolution of the benefit
claim." Id.
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pert medical testimony about the cause of his wife's cardiac arrests and malignant hypothermia to support his claim for
accidental death benefits.8 6 The court found that admitting this
evidence was justified because the evidence related to complex
medical questions8 7 and plan term interpretation8 8 and because
the administrator was an insurance company8 9 with a potential
conflict of interest as the payor of claims. 90 Reasoning beyond
the specific facts in Quesinberry,9 1 the Fourth Circuit also said
that a court may admit additional evidence when the administrator compiles "little or no evidentiary record" or provides "limited" claim review procedures, 9 2 or when the evidence was not
93
available to the claimant before trial.
According to the Fourth Circuit, a multi-factor discretionary
rule provides "flexibility" in addressing the wide variety of cases
under ERISA.9 4 In Quesinberry, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that its multi-factor discretionary rule "balances" the conflicting
goals of ERISA: 95 protecting beneficiary interests 9 6 versus pro86. Id. at 1020.
87. Id. at 1027. The court contended that expert testimony could "facilitate
the understanding of complex medical terminology and causation through an
exchange of questions and answers between the experts, counsel, and the
court." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court noted that "absent ERISA, denials of insurance claims
would not be deferentially reviewed." Id. at 1026 (citing Moon v. American
Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989)).
90. Id. at 1027. The court noted that potential bias was a legitimate reason
for admitting additional evidence even though the Supreme Court rejected potential bias as a rationale for de novo review in Bruch. Id. at 1026 n.7 (citing
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
91. Even the criteria related to the facts in Quesinberry are essentially
dicta because the case did not necessarily raise the evidentiary scope of evidence issue properly. According to the majority, the district court said it attached "no legal significance" to the claimant's additional evidence. Id. at 1027
n.8. A concurring opinion criticized the majority for taking "one side of a controversial question which has caused a split in the circuits" when it was unnecessary. Id. at 1032 (Widener, J., concurring). The majority acknowledged that
Judge Widener's argument may be sound "in retrospect," but decided that the
district judge was "necessarily influenced" by the additional expert testimony
and thus resolution of the issue was proper. Id. at 1027 n.8.
92. Id. at 1026-27 (citing Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co of America., 953
F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (8th Cir. 1992)).
93. Id. (citing Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds,
944 F.2d 1176, 1185 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. Id. at 1025. The Fourth Circuit contended that ERISA plans vary in
terms of the administrator's impartiality, the quality of the plan's administrative procedures and factual records, and the complexity of the underlying subject matter. Id.
95. Id.

1590

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1575

tecting the independence9 7of plan administrators and providing
prompt claim resolution.
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF

CIRCUIT RULES
Under the congressional directive to develop a federal common law for ERISA,98 federal courts have used three sources of
law to guide their rules on the proper evidentiary scope of de
novo review: trust law under Bruch,9 9 ERISA's legislative purposes,' 0 0 and pre-Bruch precedent.' 0 1 In addition, federal
courts have evaluated potential rules by calculating their practical effects.' 0 2 Federal courts, however, have inadequately evaluated these sources of law and policy.
A. LEGAL REASONING
1. Trust Law from the Supreme Court's Bruch Decision
In Bruch the Supreme Court relied on trust law to guide its
decision in favor of de novo review, 10 3 but the federal circuits
largely ignore the teachings of trust law on the question of the
proper evidentiary scope of review. 10 4 To the extent that the
courts mention trust law, their discussions are cursory' 0 5 if not
96. Id. at 1022 (citing Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989)).
97. Id. at 1022 (citing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 & n.4
(4th Cir. 1985)). In Berry, the Fourth Circuit identified the purposes of ERISA
as strengthening plan administration and promoting "informal and non-adversarial" dispute resolution within the plan's review processes. 761 F.2d at 1007
& n.4. The Fourth Circuit found that these purposes continue to "warrant significant restraints on the district court's ability to allow evidence beyond what
was presented to the administrator." Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025.
98. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 135-148 and accompanying text.
103. 489 U.S. 101, 110-12 (1989).
104. Most courts do not mention trust law in their opinions on the proper
evidentiary scope of review. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765
(8th Cir. 1993); Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 953 F.2d 1093, 1095
(8th Cir. 1992); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 103-05
(2d Cir. 1991); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 965-67 (6th Cir. 1990).
Two courts found that trust law weighs against finding discretion in plan instruments but did not discuss trust law's implications for evidentiary scope of
review. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944
F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888
F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989).
105. In Quesinberry v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, the claimant
argued that the Supreme Court's reliance on trust law in Bruch precludes
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wrong. For instance, the Fifth Circuit cited trust law to support
the proposition that trustees have "inherent discretion" to
gather evidence 0 6 and thus concluded that courts should limit
the scope of evidence to the plan administrator's record. The authority cited by the court, however, began "[w]here discretion is
conferred,"10 7 implying that discretion to find facts is not inherent but must originate in the plan instrument. 0 8 Thus, relying
on the administrator's "inherent discretion" to limit the evidentiary scope of review is inappropriate.
Even if administrators have discretion to find facts, limiting
the evidentiary scope of review seems to conflict with a general
rule of trust law favoring admissibility of evidence relating to a

courts from limiting evidence to the administrator's record because "in trust
cases prior to ERISA any evidence was admissible." 987 F.2d 1017, 1023 (4th
Cir. 1993) (en banc). While noting that Bruch "emphasized" trust law, id. at
1022, the Fourth Circuit never evaluated the merits of the claimant's argument. The court's only other mention of trust law was holding that trust law
principles should not apply in cases of benefit denials by insurance companies.
Id. at 1026.
106. Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1558 (5th Cir.)
(emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
107.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187

(1959). The full passage reads, "Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee
with respect to an exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by
the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of this discretion." Id. The
Fifth Circuit further noted that a "trustee can properly exercise such powers
and only such powers as... are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust and are not forbidden by the terms of the trust." Id. (quoting

§ 186(b) (1959)). The court argued that ERISA provides "some inherent discretion," namely, "'authority to control and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

manage the operation and administration of the plan.'" Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a)(1) (1988)). Thus, the court concluded that "decisions made in the performance of functions that are 'necessary and appropriate' to the daily and routine administration of plans are inherently discretionary." Id.
108. Whether a plan instrument must expressly provide discretion or
whether a court may imply discretion from the terms of the plan is the subject
of a circuit split, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, but in either case,
that discretion must originate in the plan instrument and is not "inherent" as

the Fifth Circuit held. Bruch noted that "whether 'the exercise of a power is
permissive or mandatory depends on the terms of the trust.'" 489 U.S. at 111
(quoting 3 W. FRATCHER, ScoTr ON TRUSTs § 187, at 14 (4th ed. 1988)); cf RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRusTs § 187 cmt. a (1959) ("The exercise of a power is
discretionary except to the extent to which its exercise is required by the terms
of the trust."). Bruch also held that 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21), which imposes fiduciary obligations on a person who exercises "any discretionary authority" in plan
management, does not give plan administrators inherent discretion to construe
plan terms because the scope of a fiduciary's discretion may be narrow. 489
U.S. at 112-13.
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settlor's intent. 10 9 The key difference in the ERISA context,
however, is that there is no settlor whose intentions govern the
trust."10 Without settlors' intentions to divine, courts should
look to other sources of law to guide their decisions on the scope
of evidence. Another reason to look elsewhere is that ERISA
plan administrators, unlike common law trustees, must provide
claim review procedures during which the parties may develop
an evidentiary record, thus potentially obviating the need to admit additional evidence at a bench trial."'- Indeed, courts may
justifiably look to other sources of law because Bruch did not
make trust law the exclusive guide for ERISA's federal common
law. 1 2 Nonetheless, federal courts have failed to analyze thoroughly the implications of Bruch's trust law analogy for the
proper scope of evidence under ERISA.
2. ERISA's Broad Legislative Purposes
Instead of relying on trust law, federal circuit courts look
primarily to ERISA's legislative purposes to guide their decisions on the evidentiary scope of de novo review."13 As a source
109. The Second Restatement provides that written terms of a trust instrument should be "interpreted in the light of all the circumstances and such other
evidence of the intention of the settlor with respect to the trust as is not inadmissible because of the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence rule, or some other
rule of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. d (1959); see also John
H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 527
(1982) (noting general "rule of admissibility in the law of nonprobate transfers"
to reform mistakes in drafting).
Even when a trustee has discretion, settlor's intent governs what evidence
trustees and courts must consider. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 128 cmt. e (1959) (noting that scope of inquiry under discretionary support
trusts is a "question of interpretation" relating to settlor's intent.)
110. According to Professor Conison, "Plan fiduciaries do not exist to carry
out the settlor's intent [but rather] to implement an ongoing program of providing benefits and to safeguard benefit interests." JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTsHELL 217-19 (1993) [hereinafter CONISON, NUTSHELL].
Indeed, Professors Dukeminier and Johnson note that "management of huge
pension and employee benefit funds will undoubtedly bring many changes in
the law of trusts dealing with trustees' powers and duties." JESSE DUKEMINIER
& STANLEY M. JOHNSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 922 (4th ed. 1990).
111. See supra note 33 (noting that facilitating judicial review is one rationale for the requirement that claimants exhaust claim review procedures before
suing to recover benefits).
112. Bruch rejected only the "wholesale importation" of labor law into ERISA's federal common law. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
109 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
113. Following ERISA's purposes is appropriate given that Bruch found support for de novo review in ERISA's purpose to protect plan beneficiaries. Id. at
113-14.
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of judicial decision making, legislative intent is inherently subject to judicial manipulation. 1 4 Indeed, federal courts have
largely failed to cite relevant portions of ERISA's text or legislative history to support their rulings on the scope of evidence."15
Even when courts have cited legislative history, their interpretations have been incorrect. For instance, to support its rule excluding additional evidence, the Sixth Circuit cited a Senate
report that showed Congress's intent to provide a method for
quick, low-cost dispute resolution. 1 16 The actual passage, how114. See, e.g., Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating that "legislative history can be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is").
115. Most courts cite no legislative history to support their decisions. See,
e.g., Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993); Masella v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 103-05 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierre v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1556-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). In Pierre,the court stated that, "Congressional intent
supports [its] conclusion" in favor of deferential review to an administrator's
factual determinations. 932 F.2d at 1558 n.8. The court cited four cases, none
of which, however, quoted any legislative history: Makar v. Health Care Corp.
of Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d
263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988); Denton v. First Natl Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th
Cir. 1985); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d
1301, 1304 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). Id. For example, in Makar, the court relied on
"Congress' apparent intent" to require exhaustion of claim review procedures,
noting that it would be "anomalous" for Congress to require such procedures if
courts did not require claimants to use them. 872 F.2d at 83 (emphasis added);
see also Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund,
455 F. Supp. 816 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (frequently cited for exhaustion requirement).
In Taylor, the court relied on ERISA's fiduciary requirements, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-14 (1988), analogies to labor grievance procedures, the "broad managerial discretion granted trustees" under ERISA, and a House Report which indicated that Congress "sought to 'strike a balance between providing meaningful
reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits." 455 F. Supp. at 819-20,
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4682). Given the lack of applicable statutory text and legislative history, the Fifth Circuit would have been more accurate if the court had
said that sound public policy rather than "Congressional intent" supported its
position.
116. Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990). The Senate Report, cited to support the court's assertion that a "primary goal of ERISA
was to provide a method .

.

. to resolve disputes inexpensively and expedi-

tiously," stated the following:
The committee believes that all workers and plan beneficiaries
should have the opportunity to resolve any controversy over their retirement benefits under qualified plans in an inexpensive and expeditious manner.... Accordingly, the committee has decided to provide
that controversies as to retirement benefits are to be heard by the Department of Labor.
The procedures provided by this section of the bill are provided as
alternatives to existing procedures that may be available to plan participants or beneficiaries.
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ever, refers to a proposal for the U.S. Department of Labor to
hear disputes over individuals' claims for pension benefits, 1 17 a
proposal that Congress ultimately rejected. 118 Moreover, the
passage explicitly recognized that the Department of Labor
hearings, if implemented, would be only one of several methods
of dispute resolution available to claimants under ERISA.119
Another problem with using legislative intent to guide judicial decisions is its indeterminacy.- 20 For instance, to support
their decisions in favor of hearing additional evidence, the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits relied on ERISA's purpose to protect participants and beneficiaries. 12 Protecting beneficiaries
as a group, however, does not necessarily mean helping each potential beneficiary individually. 1 22 Indeed, an ERISA plan administrator has fiduciary duties toward the plan's beneficiaries
as a whole, not merely to individual beneficiaries. 123 It is in the
interests of beneficiaries as a group to limit evidence to reduce
litigation costs and preserve funds for the future. 124 In addition,
Congress already may have fulfilled its goal of protecting individual beneficiaries through ERISA's other regulatory protections, such as information disclosure requirements and fair

S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 117, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
5000.
117. Id.
118. The Senate defeated an amendment to restore hearings on individual
claims by the U.S. Department of Labor. 119 CONG. REC. 30397, 30400 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1973), reprintedin 2 SENATE COM. ON LABOR & PUBIC WELFARE,
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

1974, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1835-38 (1976) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY].
119. See supra note 116 (reproducing passage cited by Sixth Circuit).
120. The Fourth Circuit, which explicitly recognized the "multiple purposes"
of ERISA, follows a multi-factor discretionary rule which leaves parties uncertain as to whether a court will hear a claimant's additional evidence. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993)
(en banc).
121. Id. at 1025 (citing Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86,
89 (11th Cir. 1989)).
122. See Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th
Cir.), (noting that litigation costs may deplete benefit fund), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 453 (1991); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990) (arguing that evidentiary hearings may undermine protections of employees and
beneficiaries by impairing use of less costly claim procedures).

123. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988); see

CONISON, NUTSHELL,

supra note

110, at 219.
124. See Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
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claim review procedures, obviating
the need for more judicial ac125
tion to enhance protection.
3.

Reasoning of Pre-BruchPrecedents

Recognizing that Bruch did not necessarily undermine all of
the reasoning of prior decisions,'12 6 several circuits base their
rules partly on pre-Bruch precedent.' 27
For instance, the
Fourth Circuit noted that prior to Bruch it excluded additional
evidence to "promot[e] internal resolution of claims and encourag[e] informal and non-adversarial proceedings," 128 concluding that these goals continue to weigh against admitting
evidence even after Bruch.129 Although this conclusion accurately reflects pre-Bruch law,' 30 it ignores other pre-Bruch practices, 131 such as remanding a case to the plan administrator to
consider additional evidence 13 2 and requiring plan administra125. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (describing disclosure requirements, claim review guarantees, fiduciary obligations, and other regulatory protections under ERISA).
126. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1021
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that Bruch's impact is unclear); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963,966 (6th Cir. 1990); McMahan v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 431 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1989).
127. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "the reasoning" of its pre-Bruch precedent is "still sound." Perry, 900 F.2d at 966 (citing Crews v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Crews actually did not involve much "reasoning;" it rather simply recited the
basic rule against de novo factual hearings without discussion. Crews, 788 F.2d
at 336 (citing Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981)).
Most circuits, however, have not discussed pre-Bruch precedent. See Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1992);
Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1184-85
(3d Cir. 1991); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 103-05
(2d Cir. 1991); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th
Cir. 1989).
128. See Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1022 (citing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
761 F.2d 1003, 1007 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1985)).
129. Id. at 1025.
130. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that prior to Bruch,
federal courts limited judicial review of administrator's decision to evidence in
administrator's record).
131. The Fifth Circuit did cite two pre-Bruch cases requiring exhaustion of
claim review procedures to support its rule favoring deferential review of an
administrator's factual determinations, but the court did not explain why an
exhaustion requirement supports deference. Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins., 932 F.2d 1552, 1558 n.8 (5th Cir.) (citing Makar v. Health Care Corp. of
Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453
(1991); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985).
132. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. At least two federal district
courts have remanded cases to the administrator to avoid the dispute over the
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tors to evaluate reasonably available evidence, 13 3 which may
34
favor alternative policies on the evidentiary scope of review.'

B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to legal considerations, federal courts also examine the practical aspects of allowing claimants to present additional evidence at bench trials. Courts admitting additional
evidence question the capacity of plan administrators to gather
evidence, 13 5 while courts excluding additional evidence question
36
the ability of federal courts to judge ERISA benefit cases.'
Favoring admission, the Second Circuit suggested that unlike
plan administrators, a court will impartially hear a claimant's
expert testimony. 137 Hearing such evidence may also help the
court understand the claim at issue.' 3 8 The Third Circuit contended that plan administrators are incapable of gathering evidence in a fair manner because they do not use the Federal
Rules of Evidence and other evidentiary procedures.' 3 9 Favoring exclusion, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that plan administraproper evidentiary scope of review. See, e.g., Novak v. TRW, Inc., 822 F. Supp.
963, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Goodman v. S & A Restaurant Corp., 821 F. Supp.
1139, 1142 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
133. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. One federal district court
has suggested that courts which limit evidence must ensure that plan administrators "made reasonable efforts to obtain all of the relevant evidence before
making the decision." Leahy v. Bon, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 529, 539 (D. Utah 1992).
134. Courts could remand cases to plan administrators when claimants seek
to introduce additional evidence, see infra Part IV, or courts could limit evidence to the administrator's record except when the administrator failed to develop reasonably available evidence. Cf Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1992) (limiting evidence where administrator provided "multiple opportunities" for claimant to submit evidence).
135. See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
136. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
137. Cf Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir.
1991).
138. Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1027 (4th
Cir. 1993) (en banc); cf Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552,
1559 (5th Cir.) ("[Die novo review of factual determinations is a difficult and
uncertain exercise on a cold record.") cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). As a
result of the difficulty of de novo review on a "cold record," the Fifth Circuit
defers to an administrator's factual determinations. Pierre,932 F.2d at 1559.
Of course, hearing additional evidence at a bench trial could warm the record
and facilitate de novo review.
139. Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d
1176, 1183 (3d Cir. 1991). Both the Third and Eighth Circuits also note that
plan administrators are not expert public bodies like governmental agencies,
which warrant deference. Id.; Weber v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 561 (8th
Cir. 1993).
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tors are better suited to collect evidence because they have
powers and are "closer to the facts" of each individinvestigatory
140
ual claim.
These arguments are not compelling. The Second Circuit's
faith in expert testimony is misplaced given that such testimony
is often biased and confusing to courts, 14 1 and the Third Circuit
overrates the value of evidentiary formalities, which governmental agencies often disregard. 14 2 Indeed, some evidentiary
formalities may interfere with accurate decision making. 143 In
recognizing the value of a plan administrator's investigatory
that a biased
powers, the Fifth Circuit disregards the possibility
44
plan administrator may abuse such powers.Even if federal courts are better suited to take evidence
than ERISA plan administrators, courts should evaluate
whether the supposed benefits to claimants from improved evaluation of evidence outweigh the added burdens on federal
courts. 145 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits contend that the bur-

dens would be great and that courts should not do the work of
140. Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1562.
141. Expert testimony often produces "frustrating confusion for judges and
juries and mistrust of the experts themselves. Instead of being enlightened, the
decision-makers often are more baffled than they were before the experts testified." CARNAGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, THE WORK OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN RESOLVING SCIENCE-BASED DISPUTES: SUGGESTED AGENDA
FOR IMPROVEMENT 2, reprinted in I U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, FEDERAL

COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE: WORKING PAPERS & SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS app.
(1990) [hereinafter I FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE]; cf Heasley v. Beldin
& Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1262 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that "apparently credible and informed experts" testified for both parties on whether liver transplant
at issue was "experimental").
142. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) (providing that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received" by government agency); see also Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409-10 (1971) (holding that agency may base decision
solely on hearsay evidence).
143. See Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1562-63 (upholding plan administrator's decision to deny benefits based largely on hearsay evidence which claimant sought
to exclude).
144. Cf Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1026
n.7 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that potential bias is factor in determining
whether to admit additional evidence). In Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, the plan administrator assembled an evidentiary record supporting denial of benefits then sued the claimant for a declaratory judgement.
993 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). Although the court found that the administrator's investigation was reasonable, id. at 104, Moore suggests that an administrator's investigation could slant the record against the claimant.
145. A rule excluding evidence also burdens federal courts that must determine what evidence is in the administrator's record. See, e.g., Whisman v. Robbins, 810 F. Supp. 936, 940-41 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Excluding additional evidence
as required by the Sixth Circuit, the court relied on an affidavit by the pension
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plan administrators. 14 6 Although neither circuit estimated the
actual workload burden that would result from admitting additional evidence in ERISA benefits litigation, 14 7 the Fifth Circuit
noted that plan administrators must make a large number of
benefit determinations, 148 implying that full evidentiary hearings could be unduly burdensome to the federal court system.
A thorough assessment of the circuit rules shows that all
three main rules cause serious practical difficulties. Most obviously, the per se rule excluding additional evidence may exclude
evidence showing that the claimant deserves benefits. 149 Exclusion forces claimants to seek legal assistance' 50 and to present
all potential evidence, including expert testimony, 15 1 at the earliest stages in the claim review process, 15 2 adding expense and
complication to routine proceedings. A per se rule excluding evidence is also subject to abuse if a plan administrator compiles an
administrative record favoring denial of benefits, then sues for
declaratory judgment, thereby freezing the record for judicial
53
review.'
A per se rule admitting additional evidence also has several
negative consequences. The rule allows a claimant to circumvent the plan's claim review procedures by failing to present evifund's director of benefit services to determine what evidence was contained in
the administrator's record. Id.
146. Pierre,932 F.2d at 1559 ("[C]ourts simply cannot supplant plan administrators ...as resolvers of mundane and routine fact disputes"); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that federal courts
should not become "substitute plan administrators").
147. Moore, 993 F.2d at 101; Perry, 900 F.2d at 966-67.
148. Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1559.
149. For example, in Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., the Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment because the district court had erroneously applied
an arbitrary and capricious standard and limited its review to the evidentiary
record. 10 F.3d 784, 789 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Moore, 993 F.2d at 103-04
(reversing jury verdict for $75,000 partly because district court erroneously admitted claimant's expert medical testimony).
150. Claimants are often not represented by attorneys when they make
their initial claims for benefits. See, e.g., Vanderlok v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that claimant with
sixth grade education retained attorney only after claim review process).
151. See, e.g., Kirwan, 10 F.3d at 790 (medical expert); Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1992) (vocational expert).
152. For example, in Moore, the only way the claimant could have introduced her expert medical testimony is if she had submitted it with her initial
claim, because the plan administrator provided no claim review process. 993
F.2d at 100.
153. See id. at 100, 103-04.
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dence to the plan administrator.15 4 The rule may also
significantly delay final benefit determinations if claims languish in federal court. 155 Additionally, to the extent that claimants are more successful before a federal judge than the plan
fund due
administrator, the rule could deplete the plan's benefit
56
to frequent litigation and unanticipated benefits.'
The rule allowing additional evidence will also significantly
burden federal courts through more frequent 57 and complex litigation. 15 8 Complexity will increase if courts hear extensive expert testimony or if parties pursue discovery. 159 A rule allowing
additional evidence forces federal judges into a role similar to
that of administrative law judges in the Social Security Admin-

154. Several courts have admitted additional evidence without mentioning
whether the claimant followed the plan administrator's claim review procedures. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944
F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1991); McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
888 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1989); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888
F.2d 86, 87 (11th Cir. 1989).
155. See, e.g., Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 100-02
(stating that trial court made decision nearly five years after claimant filed initial claim).
156. See Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). But see Masella, 936 F.2d at 103 (rejecting administrator's argument that "court's interpretation of the plan terms
[may force plan] to pay benefits it did not intend to offer"). In Masella, the court
noted that an insurer has the "ability to protect itself by including a provision
that gives it discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the plan." Id. For
example, ERISA allows a plan to reduce its coverage for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) treatment from $1,000,000 to $5,000 ever after a participant has "submitted his first claims for reimbursement." McGann v. H & H
Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
157. E.g., Crespo v. Candela Laser Corp., 780 F. Supp. 866, 867 (D. Mass.
1992) ("ERISA cases generally . . . constitute a burgeoning area of federal
courts' caseload.").
158. The complexity of ERISA benefit litigation is as important a burden on
federal courts, as is the sheer number of cases. I FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 141, at 33. Indeed, many ERISA cases admitting additional
evidence involve multi-day trials. See, e.g., Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d
763, 764 (8th Cir. 1993) (three-day trial); Masella, 936 F.2d at 102 (two-day
trial).
159. See, e.g., Weber v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 559 (8th Cir. 1993)
(requiring court to allow discovery and additional evidence); Apitz v. Teledyne
Monarch Rubber Hourly Pension Plan, 800 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 n.2 (N.D. Ohio
1992) (rejecting "several affidavits and deposition excerpts" because not before
plan administrator).
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given the weak fedistration, 160 a burden which is unjustified
16 1
eral interests in ERISA benefit cases.
The multi-factor discretionary rules also produce undesirable practical results, suffering the disadvantages of both per se
rules. The mere possibility of introducing evidence in federal
16 2
court may allow claimants to bypass the claim review process.
In addition, when a court decides to allow additional evidence,
163 Sithe full evidentiary trial may burden the court system.
multaneously, the threat that a court will exclude evidence may
encourage claimants to seek expensive legal assistance and expert testimony early in the claim process even if such measures
are not necessary.' 6 4 Parties also face uncertainty because the
admissibility of evidence depends on whether a district judge
the eviwill choose to exercise her discretion 16 5 or characterize
166
evidence.
the
hearing
justify
to
way
a
in
dence
In sum, the practical weaknesses of the current circuit court
rules regarding the proper scope of evidentiary review are seri160. Social Security cases are particularly "burdensome" on federal judges
because they involve interpretation of complex regulations, expert medical and
vocational evidence, and assessment of claimants' credibility. I FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMTTEE, supra note 141, at 286, 290. ERISA cases often resemble Social Security disputes; indeed, disability claimants often pursue both
Social Security benefits and employee benefits. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g,
900 F.2d 963, 964 (6th Cir. 1990).
161. The federal interests in deciding whether a single individual claimant
deserves benefits are small compared to constitutional cases which federal
courts decline to hear under current habeas corpus, res judicata, and abstention
doctrines. See I FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrTTEE, supra note 141, at 112
(discussing federal interests in deciding Constitutional cases). The federal interests in ERISA welfare benefit cases are particularly weak because Congress
passed ERISA primarily to regulate pension plans and many analysts think
that ERISA should not apply to welfare benefits. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra
note 18, at 413 ("Why regulate under a common scheme such fundamentally
different things as a long-duration pension plan and a short-duration welfare
benefit plan?").
162. Cf Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944
F.2d 1176, 1185-87 (3d Cir. 1991) (admitting additional evidence without mentioning whether claimant exhausted plan's claim review process).
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that courts often
hold multi-day trials when hearing additional evidence).
164. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (describing discretionary
rules used by Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits).
166. It may be difficult to determine whether the administrator's record is
sufficient or whether evidence is offered to aid plan term interpretation or to
determine a claimant's condition. See Donato v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 822
F. Supp. 535, 539 & n.5 (N.D. IlM. 1993) (noting potential for "hair splitting"
between whether evidence relates to plan term interpretation or factual determination), affd 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5428 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 1994).
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ous. The rules excluding a claimant's evidence undermine the
claims of deserving beneficiaries and threaten to increase the
expense of routine benefit claim procedures. 167 The rules admitting additional evidence create more complicated and expensive
litigation which burdens the federal courts. 168 Without a compelling legal rationale for either rule, 16 9 federal courts should
seek a pragmatic rule that takes advantage of the strengths of
plan administrators yet adequately protects claimants'
interests.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A LIBERAL REMAND POLICY
When a claimant seeks to introduce evidence that he did not
present to the administrator, federal courts should remand ER-°
ISA benefit cases to plan administrators for reconsiderationY
Absent congressional action to reduce ERISA's burden on federal courts,' 71 a remand policy is the best way to limit the burdens on federal courts while protecting claimants' interests. A
liberal remand policy would protect claimants by giving the plan
administrator an opportunity to reverse the decision denying
benefits, 17 2 by providing an incentive for plan administrators to
improve their claim review procedures, 1 73 and by ensuring that
the administrator's record includes claimants' evidence for a
167. See supra notes 149-152 accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 103-134 and accompanying text.
170. See Novak v. TRW, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Goodman v. S & A Restaurant Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (S.D. Miss. 1993); see
also Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983) (remanding
under arbitrary and capricious standard because claimant sought to introduce
significant evidence even though administrator based denial on substantial
evidence).
171. For example, an administrative agency could adjudicate disputes over
ERISA benefits as proposed during Congressional debate over ERISA. See
supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. Senator Hartke argued that "employees' pension rights cannot be asserted effectively if their vindication requires resort to the courts." 119 CONG. REC. 30,400 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1973)
(statement of Sen. Hartke), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
118, at 1836. An administrative agency could "furnish a prompt, continuous,
expert and inexpensive method" for adjudicating ERISA benefit claims. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). Of course, agency adjudication of ERISA
claims could be "vastly expensive and complex." 19 CONG. REc. 30,401 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1973) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprintedin 2 LEGIsLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 118, at 1836.
172. Cf., Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80,83 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting
that under exhaustion requirement "subsequent court action may be unnecessary in many cases because the plan's own procedures will resolve many
claims").
173. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.

1602

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1575

court to review de novo, if necessary.' 7 4 This remand policy offers more protection for claimants than the limited remand policy federal courts followed before Bruch; under the limited
remand policy, federal courts rejected a claimant's proffered evidence whenever the administrator's record provided "substan175
tial evidence" to support denying benefits.
A liberal remand policy also would reduce the burden on
federal courts from ERISA benefits litigation. The policy not
only would avoid full evidentiary hearings in federal court, but
also would encourage administrators to provide a new procedural step 7 6 at which parties would know they must prepare for
trial. A new procedural step would ensure that parties complete
the administrator's evidentiary record, 177 enabling courts
to
178
judge many ERISA benefits cases on summary judgment.
In addition, a liberal remand policy would help plan administrators maintain control over benefit plan administration.
From a fiscal perspective, plan administrators prepare evidentiary records less expensively than federal courts.' 7 9 Plan administrators also could avoid the costs of litigation by reaching
settlements with claimants.' s0 Moreover, a liberal remand pol174. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
176. If plan administrators know with certainty that federal courts will remand cases when claimants seek to introduce additional evidence, they would
have an incentive to provide a process for reconsideration to avoid the inconvenience and expense of a trip to federal court. Over time, such procedures would
obviate the need for a special remand policy because courts would remand
under the exhaustion of plan remedies requirement. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
177. Careful preparation would avoid disputes over what evidence the administrative record includes. See Whisman v. Robbins, 810 F. Supp. 936, 94041 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (taking evidence on what constitutes administrator's
evidence).
178. See Goodman v. S & A Restaurant Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (S.D.
Miss. 1993) ("Because there is no dispute as to what evidence was considered by
the plan administrator [after remand], it would serve no useful purpose to delay
a decision in this case pending a trial."). But see Hamilton v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 799 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (rejecting summary judgment due to "contradictory evidence" in administrator's record).
179. Cf. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
internal plan claim resolution procedures will help "minimize the costs of
claims settlement for all concerned").
180. See Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (D.
Minn. 1989) (approving settlement upon reconsideration when administrator
paid $1,440 out of disputed $4,337). The opportunity to settle is particularly
important because many ERISA benefit claims have low financial values compared to the costs of litigating and hiring expert testimony. See, e.g., Weaver v.
Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 156 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (suit for
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icy would help avoid "adversarial litigation" in favor of private

respect for the
dispute resolution' 8 1 and would signal a court's
182
plan's administrator and other fiducaries.
One objection to a remand policy is that such a policy may
be a "useless formality" in cases in which the claimant's evidence is unlikely to change the outcome. 18 3 The fear is that a
remand policy will merely delay a court's timely resolution of the
dispute.' 8 4 Making an exception for trivial or redundant evidence, however, would undermine the incentives created by a
liberal remand policy.' 8 5 By contrast, remanding in such cases
only would require plan administrators to read the evidence and
$4,369.60); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir.
1991) (suit for $1,558.43). Plan administrators, however, may have a strong
financial incentive to fight even small claims if a litigated outcome affects how
the administrator must decide future claims. Cf. Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co.,
974 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "whether the administrator has
given the plan a uniform construction" is a factor in deciding if administrator
abused discretion).
181. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985).
182. Cf Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting
that exhausting claim review procedures allows plan administrators and fiduciaries to "correct their errors").
183. Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
627 F.2d 820, 828 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 349
(D.D.C. 1958)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
184. If plan administrators seek to delay the process by introducing additional evidence to the court, courts should exclude the administrator's evidence
as an impermissible post hoc rationalization of a benefit denial. See Phillips v.
Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding nothing in record to support
administrator's decision and thus granting benefits); cf Burlington Truck Lines
v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962) (holding that "posthoc rationalizations" are inadequate bases for governmental agency decisions). But see
Weber v. Saint Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring court to
consider plan provisions that may justify benefit denial even though administrator's decision did not rely on said provisions); Farley v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 660 (8th Cir. 1992) (allowing court to consider other plan
provisions not relied on in administrator's decision). A rule excluding additional evidence offered by the plan administrator would protect beneficiaries
and give administrators an incentive to provide better explanations of their
decisions.
185. If a court made a preliminary determination about the quality of a
claimant's evidence, plan administrators may choose to argue against the quality of the claimant's evidence rather than including reconsideration procedures
in the plan instrument. Cf. Goodman v. S & A Restaurant Corp., 821 F. Supp.
1139, 1142 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (noting that administrator objected when court
remanded case). In addition, a preliminary determination would force courts to
examine the very evidence that was too burdensome for courts to hear in the
first instance. See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text (describing burdens on federal courts from hearing additional evidence).
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add it to the claimant's file record.' 8 6 Moreover, frivolous additions to the record are unlikely to occur because claimants, like
in suffering through inplan administrators, have no18 interest
7
steps.
procedural
convenient
A second objection is that plan administrators may not have
adequate procedures for rehearing benefit decisions. 188 One
reason claimants seek to introduce additional evidence to the
court is that the plan administrator did not offer adequate opportunities to submit evidence in the first place. 18 9 Procedural
shortcomings, however, do not necessarily mean that courts
should hear evidence. Instead, courts could address procedural
inadequacies directly under ERISA's provisions requiring "full
and fair" claim review procedures.' 9 0 In addition, Congress or
federal regulators could strengthen standards for claim review
procedures. 191 Nonetheless, if courts hear evidence in cases in
which the plan administrator has no procedures for reconsidera186. See Grossmuller v. International Union Local 813, 715 F.2d 853, 858
n.5 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that ERISA's procedural requirements do not require
administrator to hear oral testimony).
187. Indeed, if claimants know that they cannot force a federal court to hear
new evidence, they are more likely to present such evidence to the plan administrator during the plan's claim review procedure. Cf Masella v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting potential burden on
claimants that might result from presenting evidence to administrator).
188. This may be particularly true for benefit plan administrators who are
not aware that ERISA regulates their plan. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989) (noting that defendant did not know ERISA
governed its termination pay plan and had not established any claims procedures); see also supra note 17 (noting that whether benefits constitute plan is
an issue in many ERISA suits).
189. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1027
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that "very limited" claim procedures justify
hearing additional evidence); VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
956 F.2d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that lack of adequate notice deprives
claimant of opportunity to present evidence addressing administrator's reasons
for denying benefits).
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1993). Most courts
hold that claimants may not receive a substantive remedy for an administrator's prodecural violation. See, e.g., Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 393
(7th Cir. 1983); Fischman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 513,
517 (D. Conn. 1991); Jenkinson v. Chevron Corp., 634 F. Supp. 375, 380 (N.D.
Cal. 1986). One court, however, awarded the claimant financial penalties of
$50 per day, or $15,775, for the administrator's procedural violations. Garred v.
General Am. Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1190, 1201 (W.D. Ark. 1991). Courts
may also award claimants attorney's fees when they challenge procedural violations. Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan of Johns Mansville Corp., 803 F.2d
109, 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
191. See 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1988) (authorizing new regulations).
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tion,192 this would strengthen the incentive for plan administrators to provide better claim review procedures. Nor would an
exception to the remand policy for inadequate procedures unduly burden federal courts, which already evaluate plan proce193
dures under ERISA.
Finally, claimants may object that plan administrators will
abuse their access to a claimant's evidence by carefully rebutting the claimant's evidence in the record 9 4 or that courts will
be incapable of appreciating their claims without full evidentiary hearings. 19 5 Neither objection should preclude a liberal remand policy because claimants will be free to add to the
administrative record to raise these issues and to bring them to
the court's attention. If a judge is concerned about bias, she can
increase her scrutiny of a decision under the de novo standard, 96 or when a judge feels the need to understand an issue
better, she can focus her attention on that issue,' 97 thereby assuring the claimant's protection.
CONCLUSION
Following Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch198 , federal
circuit courts have split over the proper evidentiary scope of de
novo review in ERISA benefits litigation. The circuits disagree
over whether to exclude or admit a claimant's evidence that he
192. See Quesinberry,987 F.2d at 1027 (allowing courts to admit additional
evidence where administrator provided "very limited" review procedures); Sturgill v. Lewis, 372 F.2d 400, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (threatening to
hear evidence if pension trustees fail to "conform to at least elemental requirements of fairness").
193. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In addition, courts are familiar with enforcing minimal procedural standards from judging procedural
due process cases in constitutional law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (terminating Social Security disability recipients); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (terminating public welfare beneficiaries).
194. Cf. Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting potential burden on claimant that might result from presenting
evidence to administrator before trial).
195. See Quesinberry,987 F.2d at 1027 (approving use of expert medical testimony to clarify complex medical issues).
196. Cf. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that under arbitrary and capricious standard federal courts used a "sliding scale of judicial review" depending on "suspicion of
partiality").
197. Cf Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) (stating that judges "have had to acquire the learning pertinent to
complex technical questions" to conduct review of agency decisions), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
198. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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did not present to the benefit plan administrator during the
plan's claim review process. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits follow
per se rules excluding the claimant's evidence, while the Eleventh Circuit follows a per se rule admitting such evidence.
Other circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit, follow multi-factor
discretionary rules specifying instances when a district court
may admit the claimant's additional evidence.
Each rule produces undesirable practical results. Excluding
evidence hinders ERISA's policy of protecting potential beneficiaries and encourages claimants to employ lawyers and expert
witnesses early in the claim review process, perhaps unnecessarily. Admitting additional evidence burdens federal courts
through full evidentiary hearings on detailed medical and disability cases and potentially depletes the benefit fund through
more costly litigation. A discretionary rule creates uncertainty
about whether claimants should spend heavily in the claim review process and whether administrators should strengthen the
plan's claim review procedures.
This Note proposes that courts remand cases to plan administrators for reconsideration when claimants seek to introduce
additional evidence. A liberal remand policy would reduce the
burdens on federal courts by eliminating full evidentiary hearings and would utilize the practical strengths of plan administrators to develop evidence. A remand policy also would
essentially create a new procedural step in which parties could
settle their disputes or prepare to litigate by augmenting the administrative record which, if necessary, would serve as the basis
for a court's de novo review.

